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Wendy Olsen’s “Bridging to action” is a timely intervention that seeks to reorient 
development research (Olsen, 2019a). Olsen’s position takes as its point of departure the 
growing schism between action research and the use of randomised control trials (RCTs) and 
specifically argues for a realist alternative approach as one way to underpin and 
operationalize development research. In the following short essay, I set out the terms of the 
underpinning warrant for the argument and in the conclusion suggest additional ways to 
elaborate.  
 
The problem to be addressed 
 
RCTs focus on an observable specific feature of a situation, that can, through design, “in 
principle” be isolated, seek equivalent groups and apply an intervention to a treatment group, 
which can then be contrasted with a control group; the intervention is subject to a hypothesis 
test and an analytical statistical measure of the existence and strength of an effect. For 
advocates of RCTs the approach encourages a focus on “what works”, is pragmatic in so far 
as it is not overburdened by received theory or ideology, is transparent in procedure and 
claims, and these are fundamentally empirical (which others can replicate); the dominant 
inference is that RCTs provide a substantive means to justify generalization of the 
intervention from the specific case, which ought to lead to better outcomes in an 
instrumental sense. That is, one replicates the measurable effect for the population and does 
so based on policy that has been derived from a “scientific” method – so policy is rooted in 
“rigour” and this in combination with transparency means intervention is more “credible” and 
is likely to be “efficient” in the economic sense of that term when implemented by a donor 
agency, NGO, government etc (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo, 2017).  
  
However, RCTs are increasingly recognized as problematic. This is in several fundamental 
ways (see, for example, Ravallion, 2012; Deaton and Cartwright, 2018; Sindzingre, 2019). 
Perhaps most importantly, the application of RCTs is not just adoption of an approach, but 
rather the creation of a socio-political process with consequences for its object of study and 
field of intervention (“development”). RCTs have become dominant in development research 
and the effects are cumulative and self-reinforcing. The claim of scientific rigour and the 
production of measurable (costed) effects appeals to donors, since they must justify the use 
of funds to some constituency. A growing preference for RCTs means that interventions that 
are conducive to an initial RCT format tend to be ones that become development 
programmes. As a result, the assessment of development programmes increasingly requires 
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an RCT skillset and so the field of recognized development expertise is gradually captured by 
RCT proponents, whilst the dominance of the RCT skillset simultaneously works to 
disempower or marginalize the skills and voices of other experts who might place a brake on 
the cumulative tendency towards RCT adoption; and so the development of development 
increasingly becomes one focused on and through RCTs. Recipient countries, meanwhile, are 
also potentially disempowered, since socio-economic policy can become weighted towards 
interventions based on RCTs funded by donors, to which the recipient may lack the political 
will, resources or expertise to object.   
 
There is, therefore, a political economy to the sociology of knowledge effects of RCTs. Though 
RCT proponents are well-intentioned, they have captured the broader field of development 
in ways that reduce the real plurality, and inter and multi-disciplinary basis of applied 
development research. This has reduced the capacity of critique to operate effectively and 
for the actual practice of development to cope with its own cumulative power asymmetries. 
Martin Ravallion has been particularly vocal in claiming that development has become 
skewed towards individual interventions of some measurable kind and that these reduce the 
scope of development to some given alleviation rather than more broad-based 
transformation, which may in the end be self-limiting.  
 
There is a further normative issue here in so far as a measurably better outcome raises the 
questions of better than what and under what conditions and for whom? RCTs both by 
methodological focus and by the consequence of their dominance create problems of 
equality of participation in the deliberation that affects the dynamics of answers to these 
questions. Moreover, it does so because of the precedence RCTs have acquired through 
claims to be rigorously scientific in orientation. However, this status as adequate science too 
is open to dispute. It can be argued that RCTs have captured the field despite fundamental 
problems of modelling and questions regarding efficacy – which may indicate that it is 
because of capture of the field rather than by virtue of adequacy that RCTs continue to 
dominate -- the approach has achieved a “lock-in” creating a path dependence in 
development research. The implication is that the dominance of RCTs expertise is self-
confirming, since any failure is positioned as relative success according to scientific method: 
problems are expressed as limitations and are grounds for iteration rather than repudiation 
of the approach. However, if one looks beyond the dynamics of this self-confirming position 
then the adequacy of RCTs depends on three sets of conditions: 
 
1. The efficacy of design depends on it being possible to identify similar groups and to 
isolate a significant feature for a treatment to be applied to one group and where the 
measurable effect can be assumed to be contrastive to a control group; this requires 
significant subsequent difference to be reducible to what is isolatable, which in turn 
requires consistency for similarity in both what is isolated from and in what is initially 
isolated (for the difference to subsequently apply as a group contrast), and this 
requires a threshold of homogeneity within both groups and between both groups for 
the isolation to be practical.1 This is an order of design which cannot be achieved for 
human social subjects, it can only be asserted based on the attempt -- based on claims 
regarding some observation that licenses assumption regarding the constituting 
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components (in the end similarity must mainly be found rather than designed, for the 
assumptions to be warranted). Multiple critiques demonstrate that what proponents 
claim to be viable and simple is in actuality a high (and thus rare or forbiddingly 
difficult) benchmark. However, even allowing that the procedure can to some degree 
be reasonably attempted in some circumstances (approximating its ideal form):     
2. The relevance of design for the control and treatment groups in the RCT depends on 
it being not just possible but also meaningful to isolate a particular feature to 
introduce an intervention to produce a measurable effect. That is, for the isolation to 
be a relevant exercise with meaningful results, it must be assumed that the production 
of the effect is not significantly different in its operation and consequences when 
produced in isolation than it could or would otherwise be for the members of the 
group. Multiple critiques demonstrate that model misspecification is technically 
difficult to identify (because some statistical tests can be passed irrespective and 
because some problems are allowed to persist under such categorisations as 
“observational equivalence”) and yet misspecification is a continual possibility. The 
restriction of an RCT design distorts the complex constitutive nature of many social 
phenomena, such that the conditions that produce the feature are not meaningfully 
expressed via isolation. As such, though “internal validity” may be claimed it cannot 
genuinely be established – and, concomitantly, the possibility of model 
misspecification may actually imply the impossibility of specification, subject to the 
guiding methodology that informs the understanding of the RCT procedure. However, 
even allowing that, in some circumstances, a phenomenon can be identified for which 
a given and simply produced feature exists, thereby facilitating and warranting an 
isolating design procedure, the problem remains that:  
3. The relevance of RCTs as a procedure beyond the treatment and control groups 
depends on it being meaningful to export to other groups and to society at large, the 
intervention to produce a measurable effect. That is, for the procedure to be relevant, 
the measurable effect must be reproducible elsewhere according to the same set of 
conditions as the initial RCT or on the assumption that the conditions of the 
uncontrolled situation elsewhere would not constitute the effects differently or would 
not confound the effects or would not lead to further adverse consequences (and 
these are neither the same nor are they mutually exclusive possibilities). Multiple 
critiques demonstrate that exporting the intervention depends on transference of 
what is essentially an aggregated input-output manipulation that is immune to 
difference of constitution, such that the procedure is context independent (over and 
above the terms of the intervention, differences make insufficient difference to affect 
the effect). This is an extremely stringent criteria, and, as such, “external validity” 
cannot be presupposed; it, therefore, follows that RCTs cannot provide a substantive 
means to justify generalization of the intervention from the specific case, in so far as 
RCTs cannot provide a priori-type grounds for claims and this remains the case even if 
(and this is a major if) the RCT procedure can be seen to work in the particular case --  
the extension is indeterminate as to whether it would work elsewhere, undermining 
the force of argument that RCTs focus on “what works” or provide any special  status 
of “efficiency”: what works requires a more basic understanding of why it works and 
this is a universal problem, but not likely one that can or could express universal 
invariant conditions (the explanation of “why” for “what” matters precisely because 
difference matters).  
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In combination, 1-3 have created problems in development research for the construction of 
RCT models, the replication of research findings of RCT approaches and the reproduction of 
the measurable effect based on the generalization of the intervention. In one sense, model 
specification, internal validity, and external validity are technical issues regarding method, 
and, as such, critique is epistemic. However, the underlying critique is ontological, in so far as 
the problems of the approach are rooted in how social reality is treated. Possible differences 
of cause and consequence operative in terms of persons, the social relations of individuals, 
the group, groups, social structure, system, systems and society at large are reduced to the 
cause-effect mechanics of the RCT (group similarity, isolation, implementation, effect…). The 
underlying procedure requires the transformation of complexity into simplicity, suppressing 
significant difference, as though homogeneity rather than heterogeneity were pervasive.  
 
RCTs treat social reality as though some simulacrum of laboratory conditions was a feasible 
and appropriate scientific method to apply, but in development research, unlike laboratory 
condition treatments, interventions are not manipulations of individuated and additive or 
simply combinable material components (the inducement of a molecular or chemical reaction 
etc), but rather intervention into material social relations. Whilst for the former, assuming 
away or stripping away everything other than a given effect-focus can reveal the underlying 
invariant mechanics of that effect, in the latter one cannot take it as given that there is an 
underlying invariant mechanics that will continue to apply and one is just as liable to be 
assuming or stripping away what is important to the constitution of the material social 
relations. Exploration of complex constitution, contingency and variation may be intrinsic to 
adequate explanation, and thus to appropriately constructed interventions that work in 
different contexts and work at a societal level (since this is a different order of effect and 
intervention). This sits awkwardly with RCTs. Moreover, though proponents of RCTs are 
concerned by the ethics of approval, acquiescence and ownership of interventions, the 
practical dynamics of this fits awkwardly with the methodological mapping of RCTs – the 
procedure treats the human as merely consistently manipulable in some significant facet – 
decomposing the human as though a stimulus-response metaphor was compatible with fully 
realized humans as centers of ultimate concern; this raises basic issues about what it means 
for “transparency” to apply and for credibility to be a reasonable claim. As such, RCTs may 
make for poor social science, because the approach is based on a mismatch between the RCT 
procedure and the constitution of reality under investigation – including the treatment of 
humans as deliberative centers of ultimate concern. In any case, technical sophistication is no 
guarantor of appropriately conceived “rigour” if the orientation of methods is inappropriate.  
 
Olsen’s position 
 
The fundamental problems of RCTs all involve a mismatch between social reality and the 
projection of a science of society for development purposes. The dominance of RCTs commits 
development research to managing this mismatch as though RCTs was the scientific approach 
and as though there was no alternative. This is self-perpetuating. Olsen’s point of departure 
is simple, why not adopt a methodology that works with (claimed) characteristics of social 
reality? For realistically posed development research one can look to a (non-foundational, 
“immanent critique” derived) philosophical realism that is compatible with social 
construction and, based on its principles, embraces action research (Olsen, 2019a). Situated 
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social subjects produce, reproduce and transform social reality, subject to the potentials and 
limitations of the materiality their activity is embedded in and subject to norms and practices 
(beliefs, habits, ethics etc), according to social position (that may be class based, gendered, 
and affected by multiple other factors such as ethnicity, caste, religion etc), and subject to 
irreducible personhood (I and we are more than the sum of socialization or mere roles), all of 
which varies in place and through time. Social reality is a complex multi-faceted process 
where the past affects the present and helps to shape the future, but does so subject to 
historical time, rather than periodised, atomised and regularised, theoretical time (see also 
Morgan, 2015).  
 
Given this account, one can still systematically explore social reality working with rather than 
against its value base and variation. Social reality has duration and grounds -- events occur 
according to contexts, and we can explore and explain why events occurred in the way they 
did, why there may be reasons for the reproduction of similar outcomes and why outcomes 
can vary or be changed. That is, suitably conceived, we can explore what “causes” events to 
happen as they have, whilst realizing that this idea of cause is not some simple stimulus-
response or repetitive input-output situation analogous to the geometric collision of billiard 
balls, rather it involves conscious reflexive beings who can flourish or suffer. To flourish or 
suffer as a human being is something we can reflect upon with reference to the conditions in 
which we live (so there is a contrastive possibility based on why things have happened as they 
have and subject to what is deemed possible under the values we hold about what we desire; 
see Morgan and Patomäki, 2017); furthermore, our involvement in the terms of our own 
existence is part of what it means to flourish as a fully realized human.  
 
It is with all of the above as background that Olsen argues for a matching methodology in 
development research: a staged plural and inclusive iterative learning approach that is multi- 
and inter-disciplinary, mixed-method and collaborative. It converges around explanations of 
outcomes and around evidence use, but does so based fundamentally on the claim that 
evidence provides grounds for reasoned disagreement and agreement through “multi-logue” 
(communication), which in turn, requires participants to be capable of reasoned discussion of 
values and to be appropriately committed to the process. A sceptic, of course, might respond 
that this assumes that differentials of power, bias, and interest do not affect standpoints and 
thus both what is preferred and any possibility of agreement expressed through “learning”.  
 
However, such skepticism misapprehends Olsen’s realist argument. Olsen’s position is not an 
assumption of something unreal, rather it is an acknowledgement that progress must work 
with difference according to some meta-ethic that must be adopted for progress to be 
possible. This is self-referential insofar as the meta-ethic is no more-or-less than a 
commitment to progress through learning (a good faith criterion).2 However, the 
commitment is not unreal, but rather something we must choose to apply to reality (to 
realise) based on who and what we are. It would actually be a constructivist paradox to argue 
we are unable to adopt such a position, since this would be to assume we are unable to shape 
our own collective situation and unable to adopt others’ points of view to change our own 
and others’ terms of existence. This meta-ethic does not make agreement and progress 
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neutral or simple. As such, it has similar strengths and weaknesses to Habermas’s ideal speech 
– one either adopts a good faith approach or one does not; but any version of progress must 
seemingly begin from a meta-ethic of good faith and to some degree once one starts to think 
seriously about an objection, then the objection becomes self-cannibalizing, since no 
development researcher will position themselves as a carrier of bad-faith, and so cannot start 
from the assumption that good faith is impossible or that learning, in a position of dispute 
and difference is impossible (it is merely fallible within what Olsen terms structured or 
strategic pluralism, shaped by objectivity as open-mindedness, see also Olsen, 2019b). In any 
case, action research would make little sense without a meta-ethic of good faith. Thereafter, 
a realist approach is highly attractive because it makes sense of and works to realise this good 
faith through the informed use of methods – a methodology. As a prominent and highly 
competent social statistician, Olsen is well placed to make this case – for example, the issue 
of “equifinality” as an issue of multiple pathways to a given outcome that RCTs can only 
express in one reductive way (see Olsen, 2012, 2014; also Freedman, 2010; Gillies, 2000).        
   
Conclusion: evidence use and logical forms 
 
The Latin derivation of data is “given”, but data are never “given” if we mean by this that idata 
are passive, data are acquired and processed, and both of these are activities according to 
some procedure. The collection of data cuts into the social world, presupposing things about 
it. This cannot be neutral. Data is simply a linguistic formulation that privileges one form of 
evidence based on the connotations it carries for given methods and how we think about 
what they deliver. Data carries status, but we need to think again about this and realise that 
evidence is Catholic. What matters is insight and it is counter-productive to create hierarchies 
that a priori privilege one set of means to acquire insight over others before we engage in 
investigation. This is different than having standards or placing a value on expertise, since one 
can become expert based on open-minded pluralistic learning. Olsen makes the case for 
mixed methods use along these lines.  
 
A central theme she articulates is evidence as “traces” and research as “tracing”. Here, how 
one positions method use and findings is as important as the definitive expression of the 
procedure. Most datasets start life as surveys or categorized counts conducted somewhere, 
and it requires a degree of distance from the act to license the amnesia that typically 
accompanies the use of some datasets. More generally, an analytic statistic has grounds of 
construction and limits on what it identifies regarding some relation or outcome. However, 
we are all familiar with research where modelers, advocates of quants, statisticians etc. 
progress no further than construction of a model and the reporting of a hypothesis and test 
of a relation (with comment on limits of the model and test). Yet this when done well is still 
merely indicative in a generalized way of some underlying contingent relation, and so 
provides no more than a point of departure for an investigation of something that can be 
explained. Pursuing the explanation necessarily takes the researcher into qualitative territory. 
However, as Olsen argues, this does not entail a radical transition in evidential terms, since 
there are ways to systematically explore qualitative evidence and no simple dichotomy of 
methods according to quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
 
She, for example, is an advocate of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA provides a 
means for researchers to explore configurations of factors that affect outcomes in terms of 
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whether the factors can be inferred to be sufficient or necessary.3 The evidence source is real 
cases and the method provides specific countable expression of structured sets of different 
and varied relations. This provides quite a different basis for insights than the sophisticated 
averaging of a regression, with its frequency based probability expression. For Olsen, both 
can contribute to development research along realist lines. They are part of “bridging to 
action” when appropriately positioned as methods that provide evidence within an evaluative 
process.  
 
However, to justify the use of many methods requires an approach to the logic applied to 
such methods that reconciles rather than undermines their use. It is with this in mind that 
Olsen introduces retroduction and highlights that deduction and induction can be nested 
within retroduction. The logic of methods is not merely additive of modes of expression that 
might otherwise be deemed incompatible. Consider, for example, Condorcet’s paradox – a 
person may make decisions that do not follow the logic of transitivity because the significant 
features that affect what is decided are not identical from one decision to the next – as such, 
I might prefer A to B and B to C but C to A. What are we to make of this? It is not illogical but 
rather a reasonable process of reflexive preference, based on the way evidence is positioned 
and used. Analogically, there are a variety of forms of logic, logical expression can be internal 
to the construction of a method but also situating of the use of methods and their logical 
forms. It is implicit to Olsen’s argument that advocates of quants and statistics would do well 
to keep this distinction in mind, without it use of methods and exclusion of others can 
vandalize the world in the name of preserving (inviolable) logics of methods. RCTs, arguably, 
commit this error. However, the point is merely one facet of the mechanics of Olsen’s 
argument; what is most important is the emphasis on “bridging” that the argument for 
retroduction facilitates, and yet, ultimately, bridging to action is a (good faith) practice, and if 
we take an action research perspective to this, it is bridging in action that demonstrates its 
value.    
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